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'This (the fact that "the causal chain between money
and incomes or money and prices is the reverse to
that postulated by the Quantity Theory of Money")
does not mean that a "monetarist' economic policy
such as that of the present government is futile.
Control over the 'money supply ' which has in any
case been ineffective on the government's own
criteria, is no more than a convenient smoke-screen
providing an ideological justïfïcation for such anti-
social measures (high interest rates, an overvalued
exchange rate and the "consequent diminution in
the bargaining strength of labour due to unemploy-
ment")'.
I Lord Nicholas Kaldor 1980: emphasis added. I
Introduction
As pointed out by modern economic textbooks,
specialised journals and newspapers, monetarism is
an economic doctrine that has been gaining world
wide diffusion over the last ten years.' Several
circumstances explain its increasing popularity: the
collapse of the international monetary system established
in Bretton Woods, the lack of coordinated expansionary
policies (inspired by Keynesian principles) pursued by
major industrial countries, disturbances associated
with the instability of world prices as a result of oil
inflation, etc. All these factors are international in
character and intricately inter-related. Their overall
outcome is so complex that many economists and
politicians have begun to designate the 1970s as a
decade of crisis in the world economy. Monetarism is,
in fact, an attempt to provide a response to this
international situation. And both featuresthe diffusion
of monetarism and the world crisis are twin phenomena
because the economic theory of monetarism extracts
its main strength from simplicity of formulation: the
theory purports to be a simple (and radical) way out of
today's international problems.
*A shortened and revised version of Economic Policy in Argentina
after 1976. originally presented at the Cambridge Journal of Economics
Conference on the New Orthodoxy in Economics held in Cambridge.
UK in June 1981. In preparing the current version the authors have
benefited from discussions and comments made by the participants
ai that conference. Useful suggestions by ihe editors of this issue of
the IDS Bulletin are also acknowledged. Recognition of these coninbutions
does not implicate any of the persons involved.
The statement paraphrases the widely known monetarist dictum that
inflation always has a monetary character. When stated n those
terms, the proposition is tautological. The crucial question is to know
whether there is a one-way relationship between money and income.
On this point. see Kaldor 19701.
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According to this doctrine, capitalist economies are
remarkably stable in their behaviour. Furthermore,
monetarism tends to locate the causes of all difficulties
in too much state intervention and misleading political
promises of full employment. It is said that inflation,
or even worse, stagflation, is the price that modern
economies are paying for achieving conditions of
'ephemeral' prosperity built upon weak economic
bases. The appealing simplicity of this diagnosis is
extended to economic policy making. 'Inflation (and
stagflation) is always and everywhere a monetary
phenomenon' which requires monetary remedies.2
According to this approach Central Banks are all-
powerful institutions: they 'control' the quantity of
money that exists in the economy and it is precisely
sober management of the money supply that is the key
to price stability.
However, as the quotation from Lord Kaldor above
suggests, these (monetary) remedies are neither
economically cheap nor socially desirable. Monetarist
policy makers are fully aware of these implications
and usually claim that only sensible (and strong)
governments can consistently implement monetary
control: real cures can only be wrought by bitter
remedies, and the only contribution the patient should
make is a quota of courage to undergo the treatment.
Putting analogies aside, it has also become fashionable
to answer criticisms levied against monetarist policies
by pointing out 'successful cases' where governments
have not hesitated to apply healthy monetary control
despite certain 'short-term' socio-economic costs see
McKinnon on DIaz Alejandro 19811. Until recently,
the Chilean experience after 1973 was often quoted as
a 'successful case'.
Unfortunately, cases of monetarist failure are less
widely known, despite the fact that these experiences
are of no less intrinsic value. The following discussion
attempts to compensate for this imbalance by analysing
monetarist policies applied in Argentina between 1976
and 1981. The main contention is that these policies
may not constitute a valid solution for semi-industrialised
economies that have gone through a significant process
of import substitution, even when those programmes
are backed up by political regimes whose modus
operandi do not raise any doubts about their commitment
to an authoritarian state.
See. for example, the recent symposium on monetarism organised by
The Economic Journal and, in particular, the paper by Tobin 119811
presented at that symposium.
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Monetarism as a Strategy of Economic
Development
Economic theories and their derivative policies do not
convey the same message in different social contexts.
The sharp disagreement between Keynesians and
monetarists revolves around the best policy instrument
to 'stabilise' industrialised economies where no major
structural problems exist3. In the case of developing
countries the term stabilisation' is totally inadequate
to describe the operation of the economic policy.
What is at stake here is not the control of a certain
level of aggregate demand and domestic inflation, but
rather a more comprehensive procedure to speed up
the pace of capital accumulation of those societies
and to set up the basis of industrial growth. Economic
policy-making in that context is, in fact, an overall
strategy which makes use of several policy instruments
to transform the nature of the society. And the real
difficulties of deploying a certain economic strategy in
semi-industrialised countries are not related to problems
of implementation; the central question is to know
whether or not the ruling classes of that society will be
able to retain control of economic policy so as to
shape the productive structure according to their
intentions. This process implies both a successful
internal class alliance and a viable integration of the
domestic economy into the world market.
An important pre-condition of that development is the
role of the state, since access to it becomes necessary
in order to design economic policy. It is for this reason
that development policies in semi-industrialised countries
favour an active state role, and fiscal and monetary
policy are not just countercyclical devices, as assumed
in macroeconomics textbooks. On the contrary,
economic policies make intensive use of fiscal and
monetary instruments to establish a certain process of
accumulation. This interventionist character is based
upon the belief (and historical evidence supports this)
that development of semi-industrial economies does
not automatically follow the operation of market
forces. It may be concluded that notions based on a
belief in the intrinsic stability of the marketas argued
by the monetaristsimply not just a different policy
for dealing with the trade cycle but rather a different
strategy to tackle the development of peripheral societies.
The Argentine experience fits, in general terms, into
the mould described above. After a period of 50 years
(1880-1930) of the successful operation of an export-
led rural model, the country attempted to develop an
industrial structure based upon a policy of import
substitution. Tariff protection, credit subsidies, exchange
'The statement should be understood in relation to the situation faced
by Ides, It is far from our intention to argue that industrially developed
economies are free from difficult problems that may threaten their
possibilities of long-term growth. The present conjuncture faced by
the UK economy is a good example.
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rate management, fiscal policies and control of domestic
rural prices allowed a significant expansion of light
industries and consumer goods sectors. Industrial
development began to encounter several difficulties
in the mid-1950s as it became increasingly difficult to
expand the internal market, and the access of non-
traditional exporters to the world market was barred
because their costs were off the international competitive
line. As a result, the late 1950s and early 1960s was a
period of 'traumatic' economic growth: balance of
payments restrictions imposed an upward limit to
domestic expansion on several occasions; stop-go
cycles within an inflationary context were frequent
and the country suffered IMF deflationary programmes
on several occasions see Díaz Alejandro 19701. Foreign
capital and substantial income transfer devoted to
export promotion, and social pacts backed up either
by weak political alliances or authoritarian military
governments helped shift outwards the external
restriction and fostered industrial growth. The model
turned out to be unworkable in the early 1970s.
The industrial groups that were leading the process of
opening up the economy and promoting new sources
of investment lost control of the state apparatus.
Urban groups composed of powerful trade unions and
industrial capitalists regained influence over economic
policy and attempted to increase their share in the
national income. Between 1973 and March 1976
economic growth was based upon the expansion of
consumption through an incomes policy whereby unions
were able to obtain favourable terms for their members.
Wages went up and, therefore, industrial production
of consumer goods went up as well ICanitrot 19751.
The improvement of profit margins of wage goods
sectors and the distribution of incomes towards wage
earners associated with it did not last very long. As was
the case in the earlier crises of the 1950s and early
1960s, the expansion of the internal market clashed
with the limits imposed by the balance of payments.
The result was not entirely unexpected; another military
government took power with the purpose of imple-
menting a deflationary policy in order to eliminate the
enormous discrepancy between overall supply and
demand that the Argentine economy was suffering at
that time.
There was, however, a basic difference between the
situation of the mid-1970s and previous critical
conjunctures of inflation and balance of payments
disequilibrium. The social outcome of three decades
of import-substituting industrialisation was an increa-
singly difficult political situation where military
governments controlled the social behaviour of urban
workers and fractions of the industrial bourgeoisie
that were not reaping the immediate benefits of economic
expansion. Attempts at resisting authoritarianism and
relaxation of political conditions which surrounded
that mode of economic expansion led to outbreaks of
civil war and subsequent military coups. But in one
way or another the different military interventions
that took place after the mid-1950s had the explicit
purpose of tightening internal consumption, and favoured
the expansion of industrial investment.
However, the military authorities who seized power in
March 1976 made a different diagnosis. According to
their interpretation, the clearest (although extremely
negative) consequence of state-managed industrialis-
ation was a series of social and political conflicts that
threatened the institutional stability of the system.
What was needed above all was the restoration of
order'. In equating protected industrialisation with
social chaos, the alternative way out was also clear;
dismantling the structure of protection and the
instruments of industrial promotion would (almost
automatically) generate the basis of a less conflict-
ridden society.
The political situation and the military forces' diagnosis
did not lack their respective rationalisations at the
level of economic policy. Monetarist views and their
theoretical Walrasian foundations fitted nicely with
the stance adopted by the military. On the one hand,
inflation could rightly be attributed to large fiscal
deficits; from this was deduced the need to curb the
gigantic state. On the other, the slow rates of economic
growth of Argentina's post import-substitution period
were attributed to too much state intervention; market
forces had ceased to fulfil their allocative functions
and the consequences were apparent. Protected
industrialisation had been a mistake, bringing a long
period of inefficient economic growth. Efficiency ought,
therefore, to be achieved by restoring the operation of
the market. On these grounds too, the economic
policy encouraged a reaction against the period of
industrialisation and its associated instruments of
promotion. In sum, monetarism represented a convenient
smoke screen to launch a strategy that attempted to
alter the path of development that began almost
simultaneously with the process of import substi-
tution.
The Implementation of the Programme
Locating economic policy in the global context discussed
above helps us to understand the constraints on the
pace of implementation of the programme. At the
time of the coup, the new government faced a situation
of near hyperinflation (beginning in mid-1975) with
prices soaring at a monthly rate of about 20 per cent4.
There was also a very low level of foreign reserves and
a large balance of payments deficit5. The fiscal deficit
The rate of inflation during the four months previous to the coup was
as follows: December 2%: January 15%: February 29%: and March
38%.
The level of reserves of the Centra! Bank was 50.7 hn but external
reserves of free availability were approaching S20 mii.
was running at over 15 per cent of GDP. Despite the
fact that 1975 had been a year of negative growth
(-0.9 per cent), built-in inflationary pressures suggested
that the programme had to begin by applying further
deflation. However, the government was not just
committed fo controlling inflation for its own sake: it
regarded inflation as the negative consequence of
deeper causes that had to be cured if economic
growth under conditions of price stability was going to
be achieved.
This meant that the programme had to deploy a two-
pronged strategy. On the one hand, there was a set of
structural transformations associated with the role of
the state and the instruments traditionally used to
promote industrialisation. In this sense the target was
to shrink the state apparatus and re-create market
mechanisms within spheres previously under direct
state control. On the other hand, there was the
compelling necessity to bring inflation under control
and deal with the short term behaviour of the economy
in order to arrive at satisfactory results in that area.
The initial conditions of the programme and its long-
term targets led to an immediate linkage between the
anti-inflationary battle and the overall performance of
economic policy. Insofar as the history of Argentina's
industrialisation had been a long inflationety experience,
the evolution of the price index would be the yardstick
of success. A reduction of the inflation rate would
mean that the economy was closer to starting a new
model of growth based upon more healthy foundations.
By the same token it implied that anti-inflationary
policy was allowed to try different combinations of
instruments to deal with price increases, as these rates
were the indicators that justified the application of the
economic policy as a whole. Furthermore, the design
of the anti-inflationary policy was to be adjusted
according to the new (and different) tools of management
of the economy put in the hands of the government by
the programme of structural change.
Structural Change and the Foundations
of the New Economy
The move towards dismantling the mechanisms of
industrial promotion led to a concentration on three
major policy areas: tariffs and the foreign exchange
market; the role of financial institutions and the
organisation of the money market; and, the redefinition
of the functions and size of the state.
In relation to the first issue the objective was to reduce
tariff protection levels. (The nominal average rate for
industrial products was 95 per cent when the economic
team took office.) There was no long term plan of
reduction from the outset; during the first three years
of the economic programme tariffs were cut down at
random intervals locating the average at around 40/45
per cent in December 1978. At that time a tariff
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reduction programme was announced and its target
was to bring down the level of nominal protection to
20 per cent on average in 19846.
Foreign exchange markets were liberalised faster than
imports. First, the government abolished exchange
controls which were particularly restrictive in the
purchase of foreign currency. Second, the system of
multiple exchange rates was eliminated. Third, the
government sought the development of a floating
exchange rate market with minimum Central Bank
intervention. The first measure was promptly decreed
in April 1976; despite scarcity of foreign reserves at
that time elimination of exchange controls was not a
problem to the extent that a massive devaluation
avoided speculation against the peso7. The unification
of the foreign exchange market took place in November
1976; the government encountered several difficulties
in operating a floating system.
It is interesting to compare the government's approach
to the management of the external side of the economy
with other policies aimed at promoting industrialisation.
There is a relatively wide consensus that the Argentine
economy suffered from excessive protection and that
it had to be opened up to foreign competition. The
problem is the procedure through which the industrial
structure is exposed to foreign competition. Previous
attempts had carried out strategies aimed at opening
up the economy by starting the whole operation the
other way round; in these cases domestic production
is increasingly shifted towards the world market I Canitrot
19801. And to the extent that it was necessary to
compensate productivity differentials of the industrial
sector vis-à-vis the rural sector, mechanisms of export
promotion had been set up. That meant multiple
exchange rates, credit subsidies, tariffs and draw backs,
etc. After the 1976 coup, the government's long-term
strategy for opening up the economy meant exactly
the opposite; the domestic market begins to reflect
world prices and they represent the 'signals' for
transforming the productive structure. It is for this
reason that tariff protection should be cut down.
What the government did not take into account was
the fact that tariff reduction might be an adequate
policy if (and only if) the set of prices of the economy
(and in particular the rate of exchange) is located at
»lt should be noted that the first stage 1976-78) of the process of tariff
reduction did not have a significant impact upon the industrial
structure. There are two factors that explain this outcome. In the first
place it seems that the governments decision eliminated the margin
of excess protection that was flot used by domestic producers.
Second. according to different calculations of purchasing power
parity, the peso would have been undervalued during these two years
and, axa result, foreign competition did not represent a real threat for
domestic producers. I On the policy of tariff reduction, see Sourrouille
1981. chapter lI.]
Official rates of exchange were increased by 100/» locating the new
levels at values closer to those registered in the non-controlled
market. (Exchange rate is defined here as the price in terms of pesos
for a unit of foreign currency.)
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equilibrium levels This condition is exceedingly difficult
to fulfill in an inflationary economy like Argentina
where changes of relative prices are drastic and frequent.
In other words, the government's strategy of opening
up the economy would imply a cost for the industrial
sector in that the economic policy was not able to
guarantee an equilibriated structure of relative prices.
In fact, as will be discussed below, the actual outcome
was even worse because the government relied upon
tariff reduction and the exchange rate to control
domestic inflation.
Another structural change was financial reform. The
new system implied a shift towards a free market
where the criteria to regulate the interest rate were
liberalised. The decision implied a sharp break with
the traditionally Central Bank-determined interest
rate system applied since the mid-1940s. Similarly, the
law restored to the banks and non-bank intermediaries
the capacity to allocate credit assets according to their
own criteria. During the previous government, the
Central Bank had assumed the function of management
of credit policy, and, supposedly, financial institutions
depended directly on the Bank. This centralised financial
policy was never actually put into practice°. Nevertheless,
the new law restated the legal abolition of the old
regime.
The financial reform had two important implications.
First, the domestic money market was opened up to
foreign competition. To achieve this, the government
made every possible attempt to eliminate restrictions
on capital movements and to equalise domestic and
external borrowing costs. Second, as a result of interest
rate liberalisation, state-owned banks gave up their
policy of promotion of rural and industrial activities.
Again, the new guidelines for credit policy for
development banks meant a different notion of the
functions that those institutions should perform. Since
their creation in the mid-1940s these banks were
committed to supporting productive investment and
making funds available for special projects.
In relation to the role of the state, the basic idea was
the so-called 'subsidiary principle'ie, the state should
lay the basis for economic activity but should not
actively intervene in any way that precluded the
operation of the private sector. However, policies
aimed at reducing the absolute size of the state machinery
were not very successful. In fact, during the five years
of the economic programme, public investment (as a
percentage of GDP) was at the highest point of the
whole decade. The economic difficulties that faced
the government in that area were closely linked to
previous decisions and political aspects. Ön the one
lf that condition is fulfilled, free trade theorems demonstrate that
tariffs represent a reduction of 'welfare' and losses in production.
Deposits had been nationalised during the first period of Import-
substitution (1945-55).
hand, the programme of Public Works had already
started when the economic team took office in 1976
and there were serious technical difficulties in halting
projects. On the other hand, the outbreak of conflicts
with Chile on problems of border demarcation led to a
costly programme of military expenditure.
Nevertheless, the implementation of the subsidiary
principle' was more effective in other areas. For many
years different economic policies had implemented
different measures of price control or price guidelines
for the private sector as a way of putting a brake on the
inflationary pressures that made the operation of
incomes policies difficult. Disregarding price and income
distribution consequences, the 1976 economic
programme decreed a thorough price liberalisation,
thereby assuming that anti-inflationary policy could
not be mounted on principles that contradicted the
theoretical premises of the plan.
An extension of this view was also applied to the
labour market. There was military intervention in
unions, the right to strike was abolished, and the
government began to prepare a new bill to modify the
structure of trade union organisation.
Apart from these moves towards liberalisation of the
economy there were other measures of a structural
character. For example, the government decreed a
new legal framework for foreign investment. The new
bill granted more favourable conditions of profit transfer,
depreciation of investment and exemption from foreign
exchange controls, even during situations of Central
Bank's reserve emergency. Trade liberalisation and
the law seeking to attract foreign investments were
not enough. Financial flows were mainly restricted to
short-term operations which responded quite elastically
to differences in interest rates. These poor results are
not surprising since a large portion of foreign capital
invested in Argentina during the late 1950s and early
1960s had the explicit purpose of orienting its production
towards the internal market and gaining from tariff
protection. Thus, the economic strategy conflicted
with the interests of long-term foreign investors.
Stabilisation policies
In analysing government strategy on short-term
problems, it should be recognised that, in fact, several
strategies were implemented over the five years under
review. As explained above, the high rate of inflation
meant that policy was directed towards bringing price
rate increases down.
Traditional policies of external and
internal adjustment
During the first two years the authorities followed a
set of policies resembling typical IMF stabilisation
packages. Over the next two years, the economy
witnessed the implementation of a policy whose
monetarist underpinnings along the lines of the new
orthodoxy are so clear that it makes Argentina a text-
book case.
The stabilisation programme launched immediately
after the 1976 coup attempted to build up the exhausted
stock of foreign reserves and to halt the runaway
inflationary process. lt was composed of a set of
measures that pushed down aggregate demand through
nominal wage freeze and, additionally. eased the balance
of payment deficit by encouraging rural exports.
Given the structure of the Argentine economy, it is
not very difficult to improve, quite quickly, the short-
term evolution of the external side of the economy.
The control of inflation is a more complex task.
Exchange rate devaluation immediately takes incomes
away from the urban groups and transfers them to the
rural sector. This measure also produces a substitution
effect that speeds up external adjustment. At the same
time, devaluation implies a higher absolute (and relative)
level of rural prices that reduce real wages (if nominal
wages are kept constant), thereby triggering off a
declining trend of internal consumption and increasing
exportable rural surpluses. Lower levels of consumption
have, in turn, an indirect (and beneficial) effect on the
import bill because it diminishes the demand for
imports. In all likelihood, if political conditions can
sustain the reduction of real wages, the balance of
payments gets under control. There has been, however,
some controversy as to whether devaluation and nominal
wage control is enough to beat inflation. While some
authors argue that devaluation deflates the overall
level of economic activity, others suggest that these
measures should be applied with a restrictive monetary
policy IDíaz Alejandro 1965, 1970; Sidrauski 19681.
The actual outcome of the 1976 devaluation was
undoubtedly successful in terms of balance of payments,
although it had mixed results in terms of output. Price
effects associated with devaluation and falling internal
consumption allowed imports to fall. A record harvest
pushed up exports and the current account was, in
consequence, rapidly controlled. Output fell during
1976 (-1.7 per cent) although it began to recover in
the last quarter of that year and followed an upward
trend during 1977 (4.9 per cent). As a result the
government found it difficult to put an effective brake
on inflation. Furthermore, during the last two quarters
of 1977 short-term capital inflows flew into the country,
attracted by high nominal interest rates (interest rates
began to go up after the liberalisation of the money
market).
This meant that even within an 'excess aggregate
demand' diagnosis the economic policy of the first two
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years did not apply strong deflationary shock treatment,
as was the case of previous stabilisation packages
implemented in Argentina during the early 1960s.
These results were not those desired by the government;
its room for manoeuvre was constrained by external
and internal factors. On the one hand, international
liquidity made available finance that could be used by
borrowers with access to external credit. On the other
hand, there were many internal restrictions: it was
impossible to cut down the fiscal budget to a level
compatible with the reduction of inflation; sweeping
devaluation put a considerable distance between foreign
competitors and local (industrial) producers who were
able to increase domestic prices even when tariffs
were being reduced; and, finally, there was a clear
political decision not to increase unemployment
]Beccaria 1980].
The relatively successful performance of economic
policy in terms of external equilibrium and the evolution
of domestic output was, however, a source of permanent
difficulties on the inflation front. Between mid-1976
and the third quarter of 1977 prices were rising at an
average monthly rate of eight per cent. This figure
represented an improvement in relation to the evolution
of prices over the last months of the previous government,
but this lean victory could not be considered an
adequate basis for stable economic growth. As a
consequence, the economic team began to develop
specific anti-inflationary instruments.
A first attempt was made in the last quarter of 1977,
when the Central Bank decided to tighten up the
expansion of domestic credit. The problems created
by the budget deficit were solved through cutting off
Central Bank financing of the public sector. PSBR
began to be covered by Treasury bills sold to the
public, and the demand for finance raised by deficit
public enterprises was also channelled to the domestic
(and external) money market. The effects of monetary
policy upon interest rates were impressive. During the
first quarter of 1978 the rate of interest paid by
borrowers climbed to 14 per cent per month. For the
first time the Central Bank and its policy of traditional
credit restriction was putting up nominal interest rates
at a level which was positive in real terms (between
January and March 1978 prices were increasing at a
monthly rate of 8.6 per cent). Monetary policy also
made a drastic impact on the level of economic
activity. (Between the last quarter of 1977 and the first
of 1978 industrial GDP fell by 25 per centthe most
drastic recession since 1950, at least.) Despite output
consequences, prices did not go down. In fact, monthly
rates increased over and above the eight per cent
already mentioned that prevailed during 1976 and the
first three quarters of 1977. Stubborn inflation may be
explained by the fact that domestic producers were
attempting to resist high nominal interest rates via
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price increases (in order to diminish real financial
costs). In turn, the increasingly difficult access to
internal bank credit was being offset by the supply of
money coming from the international market.
Global monetarism
In April 1978 the authorities decided to avoid the
disturbing effects associated with inflows of short-
term financial capital. In fact, what they did was to
correct' certain inconsistencies of implementation of
the monetary policy applied by the Central Bank.
During the period of tight money supply the Bank had
been managing exchange rates and domestic credit.
Obviously, this conflicted with the monetanst premises
that informed the new economic policy. (According
to the monetary approach to the balance of payments
the authorities should control either the money
supply allowing a free floating of the exchange rateor
the exchange rate, where the money supply becomes
an endogenous variable ]Johnson 1978]. In order to
make the model consistent, the Central Bank chose
on this occasion to control the money supply, and
decided not to intervene on the foreign exchange
market. In practice their policy was different. The
extremely favourable reserve position and the evolution
of the current account made free floating very difficult.
The government feared the drastic appreciation of
the peso that might emerge as a by-product of these
measures. Consequently, the Central Bank did not
give up its intervention on the market, allowing a
further increase in external reserves. Additionally, the
Bank decided to tax the inflow of foreign capital in
order to discourage borrowing from abroad and to
flatten out pressures that would end up by appreciating
the peso. Between April and December 1978 the
Central Bank succeeded in slowing down inflows of
foreign capital to a certain extent. But domestic prices
increased more than the rate of devaluation, thereby
appreciating the peso; this, together with the high
interest rates that prevailed in the domestic money
market, offset the extra costs imposed by taxes on
foreign borrowing. The government faced yet another
failure of the stabilisation programme; the opening-up
of the internal financial market within an extremely
liquid international context led to an expansionary
monetary policy. Effective control of inflation could
not be implemented through tight money supply and
high interest rates, unless foreign exchange intervention
allowed a substantial revaluation of the domestic
currency in order to increase imports and competition
from abroad.
In December 1978 the government embarked on a
new anti-inflationary plan. As in Chile, the rate of
exchange was used as a tool to shape the behaviour of
domestic prices. The nominal rate of exchange was
fixed in advance. In practice, the Central Bank
announced a monthly rate of devaluation for the next
months. The theory was as follows: as the exchange
rate becomes the guideline for domestic pricing,
devaluation declines towards zero. At that point internal
inflation equals international inflation. The main requisite
of the strategy is that domestic producers are 'locked
in' by foreign competition. If they increase their prices
over and above the announced devaluation rate, national
currency appreciates and, as a consequence, imported
products become cheaper, thereby cutting demand
for domestic output. This substitution effect is the
essential weapon that helps to control internal prices.
This package implied a shift towards a fixed exchange
rate system where the Central Bank lost control over
the total stock of money in the economy. Within this
monetary approach to the balance of payments the
Central Bank has, in a small open economy, very
limited possibilities of controlling interest rates, since
they reflect international rates (plus or minus risk
differentials).
The degree of success of a programme of this sort
depends on several factors. First, foreign goods can
help to control domestic inflation if consumers have
almost perfect access to them. The programme will
have stabilising results only insofar as domestic products
are not competitive once their prices grow faster than
the devaluation rate. However, there are difficulties in
fulfilling this especially during the initial stages of the
programme. The Argentine economy has been relatively
closed to foreign competition for quite a long period.
The structure of commercialisation necessary to make
imports available takes some time to develop; in the
meantime local producers do not face actual competition
from abroad. Furthermore, to the extent that stabilisation
favours trading in foreign products many producers
may find it profitable to become importers. As a
result, they can have access, at least temporarily, to
oligopsonist positions that preclude prices from falling
as expected.
The second condition of success is that there must not
be excess tariff protection. If, by any chance, there is
some margin in the tariff structure, local producers
will use that margin of excess protection to increase
prices. Tariff reductions applied in Argentina during
the first two years of the plan led the government to
think that this was not the case, and that the industrial
sector as a whole was on the borderline of foreign
competition.
Another element that makes the adjustment process
more difficult derives from the fact that exchange rate
changes do not convey the same anti-inflationary
guideline for all producers; production of non-traded
goods is subject to no foreign competition and, therefore,
the pricing behaviour of this sector may prove quite
stubborn. The stabilisation plan may be effective in
controlling prices of traded goods whereas it has
limited room for manoeuvre in relation to non-traded
goods. If that is the case, the period of adjustment will
imply a shift in relative prices in favour of non-traded
goods simply because the stabilisation programme is
unable (or less able) to deal with them.
Monetarist policy makers who supported the plan
responded to problems created by differential speed
of adjustment by negating its actual validity. The
argument was theoretical and derived, again, from the
premises of the whole plan. According to them, if non-
traded goods are inflationaryic shifting relative
pricesthat process would in itself generate differential
profitability in that sector of the economy and would
end up by increasing supply and reducing prices.
On the whole, it seems that policy makers believed not
only that capital mobility between sectors was almost
instantaneous, but also that the other conditions for a
successful stabilisation programme would easily be
fulfilled. In sum it was the economy that had to adjust
to the predictions of the theory; the relevance of the
latter was obviously out of the question.
The results were however disappointing. Those sectors
which faced foreign competition and the rural sector
suffered a profit squeeze, as their prices were actually
slowed down via exchange rate management. Some
traded goods producers for whom threats from imports
were not effective and non-traded producers as a
whole did not find it difficult to increase prices faster
than the devaluation programme. During 1979 inflation
remained at 150 per cent (showing almost no change
over the previous year) and there was an expansion of
real output (6.5 per cent). This 'unstable economic
growth' was being financed by foreign lenders. To the
extent that they knew that the authorities were
committed to a pre-announced exchange devaluation
programme, there were no risks in investing financial
capital in Argentina. Rather, the real appreciation of
the peso that the economic policy was producing
made it an excellent choice. These trends (and
speculative attitudes) showed a drastic reversal in
1980. The strategy of cheap foreign currency was
producing an enormous deterioration of the current
account. Foreign investors began to expect future
devaluations and this triggered off capital outflows.
The Central Bank attempted to offset the higher risk
prime by increasing domestic interest rates. During
the first half of 1980 this measure succeeded in avoiding
drastic outflows, but during the last two quarters
speculation against the currency put even more pressure
on interest rates. As recognised by the authorities
themselves, it seemed that the Central Bank was ready
to accept any costs in terms of interest rates to put a
brake on speculation. Global output remained stagnant
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during 1980 and inflation slowed down (90 per cent).
However, these results were achieved at a very high
cost: recession in the industrial sector, a massive
invasion of imported goods of all kinds and unbearable
pressure upon Cental Bank reserves. The significant
real appreciation of the peso over 1980 and the internal
opposition to the policy of active crawling peg made
devaluation inevitable. Foreign investors anticipated
these measures and the demand for external reserves
increased sharply during January and February 1981.
The stabilisation programme was abandonned in March
1981; a new economic team and a different economic
policy has started since. The initial measures were
devaluation and restoration of multiple exchange rates.
The programme has encountered many difficulties
deriving from the effects of the previous economic
policy. Nevertheless, the question has now changed:
which instruments are used to restore the capacity of
accumulation within the industrial sector after five
years of sustained attempts to set up the basis for 'non-
inflationary economic growth'?
Concluding Remarks
In trying to give an overall view of the Argentine
experience between April 1976 and March 1981 it is
necessary to stress the unifying concept that inspired
economic policy over this period. The basic strategy
that the government attempted to develop over these
years was that the leap towards industrial maturity had
to be guided by an efficient set of prices. To achieve
that target the economic programme needed to recreate
market mechanisms, to reduce state intervention, and
to open up the economy to foreign competition. The
first two years of this economic policy can be viewed
as choosing the instruments, the necessary reforms
and, above all, the general principles that would
inspire the long-term goals of the govenment. By the
first quarter of 1978 the economic policy looked as if it
were a true representation of the old aspirations of the
rural sector that attempted to move the whole economy
back to the 1930s. The second stage (1978-81) of more
consistent monetary management proved that the
government had decided to sacrifice the profitability
of the rural sector in order to dismantle the 'inefficient'
industrial structure that had grown up during the
period of import substitution. However, there is neither
contradiction nor opposition between one stage and
the other; despite different approaches to stabilisation
policies the economic policy never experienced a 'U-
turn' in its philosophy. The same targets were pursued
over the five years although the instruments managed
by the government were chosen according to the
possibilities offered by the programme of structural
reforms.
This raises two closely related issues: the first is the
policy of trade liberalisation; the second, the crucial
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matter of political (and economic) support for the
programme.
If one compares long-term targets and instruments it
seems surprising that the government began to apply a
firm policy of tariff reduction and foreign competition
as late as 1978. If the achievement of an efficient
constellation of prices was so important to the real
success of the government's programme, why did it
not adopt a faster process of trade liberalisation? In
the first place it may be argued that the authorities
decided to await the responses of the economy to the
first stage of the stabilisation programme, the
consequences of the financial reform and the early
programme of tariff reductions (October 1976). One
can imagine how the effects of this first stage could be
used as an indicator of the type of adjustments that the
programme needed in order to be totally effective. In
this sense, the government adopted a cautious attitude,
although this is not the explanation given by the
economic team. In its opinion, the policy was 'gradualist'.
And the appeal to gradualism does not imply a concession
for a better adjustment to the policy by the private
sector but rather that the social climate that surrounded
the military coup of 1976 did not allow for further
conflict with the industrial bourgeoisie. The political
counterpart of the first stage of the economic policy
was a bitter and an almost overt civil war in which the
military forces were trying to keep institutional order
under control. Obviously, this was an extremely
unsuitable environment in which to launch a drastic
trade liberalisation strategy.
Having taken into account these elements it is possible
to take up the issue of the support to the programme.
How is it that the Argentine bourgeoisie accepted the
costs implied by the 1976-81 economic policy? As the
social and political picture of the mid-1970s seemed to
be on the verge of collapse, the industrial bourgeoisie
and the rural sector as a whole did not hesitate to
provide political support to a military coup that would
help to preserve their more fundamental interests.
Furthermore, to the extent that political reasons
precluded the government from making its trade
liberalisation strategy explicit, industrial capitalists
believed that, at the end of the day, the economic
policy would swing in their favour. The stabilisation
programme applied between 1978 and 1981 proved
that they were wrong. As this policy implied tariff
reduction and currency appreciation that began to
damage the concrete interests of the industrial
bourgeoisie (and the rural sector as well), massive
opposition to the programme began to gather strength.
Stubborn inflationary behaviour over the last two
years is a clear indicator of that opposition. If Argentina
had had a less developed industrial structure, the
stabilisation programme would have had a higher
probability of success.
Finally, global analysis of the whole period suggests
that the government was able to calculate the degree
of conflict with different economic interests because,
in fact, the policy was representative of none. The
monetarist experience carried out in Argentina between
1976 and 1981 was a useful instrument of a military
class that thought that the real causes of social disorder
lay in successive attempts at 'inefficient' industrialisation.
In sum, monetary control represented, in this case
too, 'a convenient smoke-screen providing ideological
justification' for putting forward an authoritarian strategy
of transformation of the country.
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